from Chehade v. Foley & Lardner LLPJudge Sharon Johnson Coleman (North Dakota, Illinois) ruled today:
In order to resolve defendant’s partial motion to dismiss, the following facts are found to be true.
The plaintiff is an Arab Muslim woman who graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 2023. While attending law school, Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s Chicago law firm as a summer associate in the summer of 2022. On July 29, 2022, the defendant offered the plaintiff a full-time position. -After the plaintiff graduates from law school, he will become an associate attorney in the fall of 2023.
The plaintiff asserted that the law firm’s commitment to diversity and maintaining a diverse pool of associates was important to her as an Arab-Muslim woman when applying for a summer associate position. Plaintiff learned that there was no reference to “Muslims” or “Arabs” in Defendant’s recruitment materials and that Defendant did not have any groups with particular affinity for Muslim or Arab lawyers. I have decided to discuss my concerns with Alexis Robertson, Defendant’s Director of Diversity and Inclusion. In July 2022, Plaintiff spoke with Robertson and confirmed that Defendant would support his “authentic self.” The plaintiff alleges that Robertson promised her that he would “value and support” the defendant. [her] “Having an Arab Muslim heritage and perspective, she embraced her history and values.” The plaintiff said her decision to accept the offer of full-time employment and not pursue other work opportunities was influenced by Robertson. It is argued that the guarantee was essential.
Plaintiff was scheduled to begin work on October 23, 2023. In the weeks leading up to his scheduled arrival, Plaintiff, a longtime supporter of Palestinian human rights, spoke out about Israel’s bombing of Gaza civilians after a Hamas attack. spoke out against Israel on her personal social media accounts and at an October 11, 2023 meeting at City Hall in Chicago.
The plaintiff alleges that prior to her scheduled work day, the defendants began investigating her background and discovered that her social media posts were pro-Gaza. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant management, including Robertson, then concocted a plan to revoke Plaintiff’s job offer. On October 21, 2023, Lisa Knoller, Partner and Chair of Defendant’s Litigation Group, asked Plaintiff to attend a meeting the next day at Defendant’s Chicago office to discuss Plaintiff’s social media presence. requested. Plaintiff asked Robertson for guidance and assistance, but Robertson did not respond.
On October 22, 2023, Plaintiff attended a meeting between Mr. Knoller and Mr. Frank Pasquesi, Managing Partner of Defendant’s Chicago office. During the meeting, the plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to hostile questioning about student activities, neighborhood associations, statements made at the Oct. 11, 2023 town hall meeting, and social media posts about Hamas attacks and Israel’s response. . Plaintiff claims that despite Plaintiff’s claims that she is no longer involved, she has a previous leadership role in Students for Justice and Law in Palestine (“SJP”), a student organization at Georgetown University Law Center, and SJP’s involvement in the conflict. He also claims to have been questioned about his recent posts. After graduation, I went to SJP. After the meeting, later the same day, the defendant rescinded the plaintiff’s offer of employment.
Plaintiff brought suit alleging, among other things, estoppel for breach of contract. However, the court rejected that argument as follows:
The salient issue here is that Robertson’s statements that the defendant values and supports the plaintiff’s Arab-Muslim heritage and perspective and accepts her history and values indicate that the defendant supports the plaintiff. The question is whether the plaintiff’s employment offer will not be rescinded due to her activities and advocacy activities that she considers to be a clear promise. Arab Muslim heritage. The court has held that this is not the case.
Plaintiff finds that Defendant’s promise of assistance was an express promise not to punish Plaintiff for any actions taken by Plaintiff as long as Plaintiff believes that he is supporting Arab-Muslim tradition. provided no evidence to support it. Concluding otherwise would mean that the plaintiff, because of her status as an Arab-Muslim woman, has a “get-out-of-jail-free card” against her actions, even if they violate the defendant’s values and policies. ”.
Plaintiff further argued that Robertson knew that Plaintiff was active in the Arab Muslim community, and therefore Robertson’s statements meant that Defendant supported Plaintiff’s activities. In support of her claim, the plaintiff submitted her resume and an essay she wrote as evidence that the defendant was aware of her involvement with SJP and her experiences as an Arab Muslim woman. Attached to. However, neither the facts nor the evidence asserted by Plaintiff reasonably impute knowledge of Plaintiff’s activities to Robertson, much less to Defendant. Plaintiff also does not allege that he had any conversations with Robertson about such activities.
The examples cited by the plaintiffs also lack persuasive power. in Dugas Filippi v. JP Morgan Chase, NA (N.D. Ill. 2014), the court held that the employer’s oral promise that the plaintiff would not be fired if she took six months of paid discretionary leave meant that the plaintiff would not be fired because she took six months of paid discretionary leave. It was found to be sufficiently clear and unambiguous to support an estoppel claim. Monthly discretionary leave regardless of employer’s wishes.
Here, Robertson’s statement indicates that plaintiff’s employment do not have be canceled. Instead, the statement was solely about support for the plaintiff as an Arab Muslim woman. There is an implicit clause here that as long as the plaintiff believes that his actions are related to his ethnicity, religion, or association, he has full employment protection no matter what he does or says. There were no promises.
The plaintiffs are essentially asking the court to conclude that both parties understood that the promise of support meant a promise of job security, regardless of the plaintiff’s actions. However, the facts do not support a common understanding between the parties that would convert Robertson’s expression of support into a promise not to rescind Plaintiff’s offer of employment. The court found that there was no express promise or common understanding between the parties to support the estoppel claim.
Plaintiffs also alleged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and association. These claims were not, and remain, the subject of a motion to dismiss. note that illinois law Restrict personal threats aimed at speech related to candidates or voting methods.
Intending to induce, through coercion, intimidation, intimidation, deception or forgery, any other person (a) to register to vote, or (b) to lawfully vote, support or oppose the nomination or election of public office or other person. person who hinders A public question voted on in any election shall be subject to the crime of… a felony. [and shall be subject to civil liability].
The prohibitions on this “intimidation” are as follows:[s]”It can include not only criminal threats, but also threats of economic retaliation. So, for example, federal law prohibits ‘blackmail.'[ing]threaten[ing]forced[ing]or attempt[ing] “Intimidate, intimidate, or coerce another person with the purpose of interfering with the right of that person… to vote freely” is interpreted to prohibit threats of economic retaliation. Likewise, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal. Coercing, threatening, intimidating, or hindering any person… or because that person aids or encourages another person’s exercise or enjoyment; [of housing nondiscrimination rights]” the court prohibits firing employees who rent to black or Mexican American applicants and prohibits denying agency funds to organizations that complain of discriminatory permit denials. I interpreted it as
However, unlike these laws, some other states (Also some city and county ordinances, including Urbana’s), Illinois’ statute does not apply to job discrimination based on advocacy of ideological views not directly related to elections.
Gerald L. Pauling and Tracy M. Billows of Seyfarth Shaw LLP are representing the defendants.
