[1.] Actual Motion from Today’s Decision by Mr. Robert Scola (South Dakota, Florida) Stevens v. School BD. in broward county:
Plaintiff, Reverend Timothy “Chaz” Stevens, is an ordained minister of the Church of Demonology and the Perpetual Vespers. The church “promotes”[s] Separation of church and state through religious pluralism, secularism, and public expression of minority views. ”Therefore, “the display of banners with messages defending religious freedom and First Amendment principles is a form of sacred observance, deeply rooted in Church doctrine. We believe that advocacy is a moral and spiritual obligation. Displaying banners with phrases such as “Satan Loves the First Amendment” is essential to achieving this. [the Church’s] religious mission. ”
From December 2023 to September 2024, the defendant, the Broward County Board of Education in Florida, ordered religious organizations, including Calvary Chapel and Potter’s House, to provide school services to West Glades Middle School in Parkland, Florida. Allowed banners to be displayed at Coral Springs High School. Schools in Coral Springs, Florida. Such exhibits “convey a religious message and were allowed without issue.” These banners were put up despite the school board’s “ban” policy.[ing] Using school facilities to further religious, commercial, or political interests without approval or request from the Board of Directors;[ing] The sign must not be “sectarian in nature.” ” Specifically, the policy states:
[F]Facilities owned or leased by the school board may not be used by commercial, religious, political, or other non-district entities, except as permitted by school board-approved agreements, school board policy, or state law. or to promote or promote the interests of any organization.
In October 2023, Stevens asked high schools and middle schools to “display ‘The Devil Loves the First Amendment’ banners.” Both schools refused and removed Calvary Church banners that had been displayed on school grounds. The school board also “adopted a new policy to ‘provide the following.'[s] By providing “”, we will strengthen the oversight of the banner approval process.[a] local supervisor [] “We approve the requested banner,” the court said, “because Reverend Stevens plausibly alleges an informal practice or policy of viewpoint discrimination (as the court discusses below), the new policy is “This does not affect the court’s analysis of the school board’s motion to dismiss.” . ”
[2.] The court concluded that Stevens properly alleged that the school board’s actions violated the Free Speech Clause.
The Board of Education is said to have set up a limited public discussion group within the school by allowing some advertisements to be displayed within the school. ”[G]Government agencies establish limited public forums by opening up property that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects. ” [In] Limited public forum…[,] “The government ‘may impose reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech.’
For a restriction to be viewpoint-neutral, “the government must refrain from regulating speech when the rationale for the restriction is a particular motivating ideology or the opinions or viewpoints of the speaker.” Restrictions are “reasonable if they are entirely consistent with the views” of the government’s legitimate interest in preserving property for lawfully appropriate uses, and prohibited speech is necessarily inconsistent with the purpose of the forum. It should be. ”…
As alleged, the school board’s policy is…neutral in its appearance, and Reverend Stevens does not claim that such policy is unreasonable… [But] The cases cited in the complaint plausibly allege a “practice or practice” of viewpoint discrimination by the school board…
[3.] The court also found that Mr Stevens told the school:[] put up some religious banners while refusing to display his Flag of Religion”:
The Establishment Clause “requires the government to be neutral between religions and between religions and secularism.”. ” … [T]He said the Supreme Court replaced that decision. lemon test [formerly used in Establishment Clause cases] One of them focuses on “historical practice and understanding”. Notwithstanding the notice of supplemental authority, the Board of Education has not attempted to show that any Establishment Clause claims by Reverend Stevens are insufficient under the Supreme Court’s new Establishment Clause standard…
[4.] The court also allowed Stevens’ FRFRA (Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act) to proceed.
Under FRFRA, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving that 1) the plaintiff is engaged in the practice of a religion, and 2) that the government imposes a substantial burden on the practice of this religion. ” Only then will “the burden be on the government to prove that its actions 1) advance a compelling governmental interest and 2) are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” “Move.”
Under FRFRA, a religious practice is defined as “an act or action that is substantially motivated by religious beliefs, whether or not the religious practice is mandatory or central to a larger system of religious beliefs. means “refusal of”. The law thus targets “acts that are not necessarily mandatory or central to a larger system of religious beliefs, but that reflect some doctrine, practice, or custom of a larger system of religious beliefs.” There is. …
At the stage of dismissing a petition, the court must, of course, accept the allegations in the complaint as true… Pastor Stevens claims that the Church of Demonology is “mandatory.”[s] “Member participation in public forums to promote the constitutional principles of the First Amendment” and such “viewing of public displays such as banners.”[are] important expression of [the Church’s] religious philosophy. ”Furthermore,[f]Displaying a banner with a message upholding religious freedom and the principles of the First Amendment is prohibited. It is a form of divine observance, deeply doctrinally rooted in the Church’s belief that such advocacy is a moral and spiritual obligation. ”
Therefore, Pastor Stevens properly asserted that he was “engaging in the practice of religion.” A school board’s assertion of a lack of evidence regarding church doctrine is better addressed in a summary judgment motion or trial rather than a motion to dismiss. By preventing Pastor Stevens from displaying these banners, the school board is said to have “placed a substantial burden on this religious activity.”
The school board alleges in its complaint that it cannot defend the elements of the FRFRA claim for which Pastor Stevens is responsible. The school board’s argument regarding compelling national interest cannot be considered, given that it was only made in the answer and “was not raised in the motion itself.”
[5.] Finally, the court denied Stevens’ claim under Florida Statutes § 871.04.
No person shall post any advertisement in connection with the facility that someone’s sponsorship is unwelcome or offensive, or is unacceptable because of that person’s religion…
The court concluded that the law did not apply here.
Pastor Stevens does not allege that a banner was posted on school grounds stating that he was not welcome because he was a member of the Church of Demonology. The gist of Pastor Stevens’ complaint is that his church was prohibited from displaying banners, while other churches are allowed to do so. These actions are outside the scope of Section 871.04.
